FACTS: Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease involving a one-storey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila, Quezon City. Pursuant to the lease, Sulyap, Inc. paid, among others, advance rentals, association dues and deposit for electrical and telephone expenses. Upon the expiration of their lease contract, Sulyap demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues and deposit but Borja refused to do so. Thus, Sulyap filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money against Borja. Subsequently, the parties entered into and submitted to the trial court a “Compromise Agreement” stating that Borja is bound to pay the amounts P30,575 and P50,000 and in case any amount due is not paid within the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2% interest per month until fully paid plus 25% attorney’s fees of the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be issued as a matter of right.
Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial compromise. Sulyap filed a writ of execution against Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ. Borja motioned to quash the writ by stating that his failure to pay the amounts within the agreed period was due to Sulyap’s fault; therefore, the penalty clause should not be imposed.
Borja filed another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of execution and modification of the decision. This time, he contended that there was fraud in the execution of the compromise agreement. He claimed that 3 sets of compromise agreement were submitted for his approval. Among them, he allegedly chose and signed the compromise agreement which contained no stipulation as to the payment of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in case of default in payment. He alleged that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into the said agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted to the court in order to make it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein.
Sulyap presented Atty. Cruz as witness, who declared that the petitioner gave his consent to the inclusion of the penalty clause of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in the compromise agreement. He added that the compromise agreement approved by the court was in fact signed by the petitioner inside the courtroom before the same was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz stressed that the penalty clause of 2% interest per month until full payment of the amount due, plus 25% thereof as attorney’s fees, in case of default in payment, was actually chosen by the petitioner.
The trial court ruled in favour of Sulyap because it gave credence to the testimony of Atty. Cruz and even noted that it was more than one year from receipt of the judgment on compromise on October 25, 1995, when he questioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in the approved compromise agreement despite several opportunities to raise said objection.
ISSUE: Whether Borja is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement.
HELD: YES. While a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground of vitiated consent or forgery, we find that the testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the attendance of fraud in the instant case. No evidence was presented by petitioner other than his bare allegation that his former counsel fraudulently attached the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature to the compromise agreement submitted to the court.
Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the penalty clause in the compromise agreement approved by the court. When he received the judgment reproducing the full text of the compromise agreement, to February 19, 1997, he never raised the issue of the fraudulent inclusion of the penalty clause in their agreement. We note that petitioner is a doctor of medicine. He must have read and understood the contents of the judgment on compromise. In fact, on November 13, 1995, he filed, without the assistance of counsel, a motion praying that the amounts of P50,000.00 and 37,575.00 be withheld from his total obligation and instead be applied to the expenses for the repair of the leased premises which was allegedly vandalized by the private respondent
Even assuming that Atty. Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty clause, the status of the said clause is not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified.17 Indeed, petitioner’s failure to question the inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in the judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so was tantamount to ratification. Hence, he is estopped from assailing the validity thereof.
Finally, we find no merit in petitioner's contention that the compromise agreement should be annulled because Atty. Cruz, who assisted him in entering into such agreement, was then an employee of the Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited from engaging in the private practice of his profession. Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited "private practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. Such was never established in the instant case.
No comments:
Post a Comment