People vs. Bandian, 63 Phil 530 (1936)

FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few
moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion.

Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide

Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol—she considers him her husband as he considers him his wife—began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it was his and that they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable
to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance, to take hernchild from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she
was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she had been accused of.

People vs. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)

FACTS: 1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On June 5, 1990, Tujan was arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion to quash invoking protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile v. Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in subversion. It was granted by the trial court and the court of appeals.

ISSUE: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous charge under RA 1700.

Ratio: No.
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this case, first case was not even arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession of firearms.

However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to the accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didn’t raise this issue. PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance of subversion

Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended. Release Tujan.

Bernardo vs. People, 123 SCRA 365 (1983)

FACTS: Bemardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa’s Riceland in Bulacan from Oct. ’72 to Aug. ‘74. His son stayed with him in the house built on that land. The tenancy rights of the house were
left with the son when the father transferred but without Sta. Rosa knowing. Eventually, Sta. Rosa took possession of the whole rice field and filed a case of forcible entry against the Bernardos. The Bernardos lost in their cases before the Municipal Court Sta. Rosa sent a letter of demand to petitioners telling them to vacate their house and land but since they refused, a criminal complaint was charged against them for violation of PD 772 on squatting.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction to entertain criminal case for alleged violation of presidential decree no 772 since the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute an offence or violation of said law

RULING: Petition for certiorari is granted. No person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is
not clearly made so by the statute. Based on its preamble, PD 772 applied only to squatters in urban areas and not to agricultural lands.

PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for Reconsideration given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.

The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners’ contention that while Sec.8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application.

2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.

The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial
of the State’s right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.

PEOPLE, et al. v. Lacson, April 1, 2003

FACTS: Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims?
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified,
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been done
a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims.

2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. “Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice.

Held: Motion granted

People vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002

FACTS: Soon after the announcement on May 18, 1995 that the Kuratong Baleleng gang had been slain in a shootout with the police, two witnesses surfaced providing the testimony that the said slaying was a rub-out. On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director or Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The nextof- kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel.

On November 2, 1995, after two resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11 informations of murder against the defendant and 25 policemen as principals. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman and in a re-investigation, the informations were amended downgrading the principal into an accessory. With the downgrading of charges, the case was later transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC not due to jurisdictional questions over the suspects but due to the failure to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. Before the arraignment, the witnesses of the
prosecution recanted their statements while the seven (7) private complainants submitted their affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed individual motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. The cases were dismissed.

It was on March 27, 2001 when PNP director Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice new affidavits of new witnesses which it began to investigate and to file with the RTC. The
respondent, invoking among others, their right against double jeopardy, then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition stating that Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
bans the revival of the murder cases against him; a petition the Court of Appeals denied. On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The defendant filed for determination of probable cause and an outright dismissal in the RTC. The CA considered the original cases to be provisionally dismissed and the new cases as mere revivals. Under Section 8 rule 117 of RRCP of 2000, the cases were dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang.

RULING: Remanded to the RTC to determine if they complied with rule and case should be dismissed. There is no question that the new rule can be given retroactive effect given article 22 of the RPC. There can be no ruling, however, due to the lack of sufficient factual bases to support such a ruling. There is need of proof to show the following facts:
(1) provisional dismissal of the case had the express consent of the accused
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after giving notice to the offended party
(3) whether the two (2) year period to revive the case has already elapsed
(4) whether there is justification for filing of the cases beyond the 2 year period.

The respondent expressed consent, however, the records do not reveal whether the notices to the offended parties were given before the cases were provisionally dismissed. Only the right to double Jeopardy by the defendant was tackled by the litigants. The records are also inconclusive with regards to the 2-year bar, if within or without. Because of this, both prosecution and defendant must be given ample time to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the adduced evidence.

People vs. Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)

FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering People’s Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the victim was sitting, pulled his hair, and poked a knife at the latter’s throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun, entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from behind and shot him six times successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove Florida’s unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 years.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime occurred in 1994) is applicable

No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm was still not an aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.

2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession of firearms and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years.

Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under PD No. 1866. t is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance, no longer as a separate offence.
According to the article 22 of RPC, retroactivity of the law must be applied if it is favourable to the accused.

3. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused of murder

No. For self-defence to prosper, unlawful aggression, proportionality of methods to fend said aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In this case, defendant failed to prove unlawful aggression. The statement that the victim approached him with a bolo was inconsistent to the witness’ statement of the victim being in a prone position in the table. This does not constitute the requisite quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. With the first requirement missing, the last two requisites have no basis.

4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for muder which was not proven and that the alleged murder committed by the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the offense is reclusion perpetua due to to the absence of an aggravating circumstance.

Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances to a crime of murder as described by art 248 of RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be imposed in according to article 63(2) of RPC

People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:

• Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
  
• Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
• Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep

Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.

In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970)

FACTS: Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized nonstock, non-profit corporation contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8 saying it violates due process rights of association, freedom of expression and is an ex post facto law

ISSUES:
1. WON it violates three rights?
No. It’s set up to prevent prostitution of electoral process and equal protection of laws.

2. Whether or not it is an ex post facto law?
No. Ex post facto law defined:
a. makes criminal an act done before law was passed and punishes act innocent when done.
b. aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was
c. inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed
d. alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different tests
e. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of right which when done was lawful

Petition denied. Constitutional act.

Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws. Penalty in law imposed to acts committed after approval of law.

Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions.

They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. In
People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the accused for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that could
have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions favourable to the accused/convicted for the same
crime can be applied retroactively)

RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal
system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.

Miquibas vs. Commanding General, 80 Phil. 267 (1948)

NATURE: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

FACTS: Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian employee of the US army in the Philippines who had been charged of disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the US army in violation of the 94th article of War of the US. He was arrested and a General Court-Martial was appointed. He was found guilty. As a rule, the Philippines being a sovereign nation has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the US shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within said portions of territory.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the offense has been committed within a US base thus giving the US jurisdiction over the case.

No. The Port of Manila Area where the offense was committed is not within a US base for it is not names in Annex A or B of Article XXVI of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) and is merely part of the temporary quarters located within presented limits of the city of Manila. Moreover,
extended installations and temporary quarters are not considered to have the same jurisdictional capacity as permanent bases and are governed by Article XIII paragraphs 2 and 4. The offence at bar, therefore is in the beyond the jurisdiction of military courts.

2. WON the offender is a member of the US armed forces

No. Under the MBA, a civilian employee is not considered as a member of the US armed forces. Even under the articles of war, the mere fact that a civilian employee is in the service of the US Army does not make him a member of the armed forces.

U.S. v. Ah Sing, 36 Phil. 978 (1917)

Cf. French vs. English rule

FACTS: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on a steamship. The steamship is a foreign steamer which arrived the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage
direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on making the search found the cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his
intention to import the prohibited drug.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has been proven?

RULING: Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the vessel from which the drug discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In this
case, it is to be noted that Sec. 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, “Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands…” Import and bring should be
construed as synonymous terms. The mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. The importation is not the making entry of goods at
the customhouse, but merely the bringing them into the port, and the importation is complete before the entry to the customhouse. Moreover, possession for personal use is unlikely, judging from the size of the amount brought.

Liang vs. People, 323 SCRA 652 (2000)

FACTS: Petitioner is an economist for ADB who was charged by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong city for allegedly uttering defamatory words against her fellow worker with two
counts of grave oral defamation. MeTC judge then received an office of protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs, stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the agreement bet ADB and the government. MeTC judge, without notice, dismissed the two criminal cases. Prosecution filed writ of mandamus and certiorari and ordered
the MeTC to enforce the warrant of arrest.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.

RULING: He is not covered by immunity because the commission of a crime is part of the performance of official duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that a certain person is covered by immunity. That
a person is covered by immunity is preliminary. Due process is right of the accused as much as the prosecution.

Slandering a person is not covered by the agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime such as defamation in the name of official duty. Under Vienna
convention on Diplomatic Relations, commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

On the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear than no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction nor does it
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.

Raquiza vs. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 (1948)

FACTS: By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur, petitioners were arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under security commitment order No 385. The
petitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were charged with Espionage activity with the Japanese, active collaboration with the enemy respectively. Power for Commander of the US
Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not questioned. He based proclamation on the reasons that the apprehended have violated due allegiance to the US and it is a military necessity. Petitioners move for writ of Habeas Corpus.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation? [Note: The power of commander in chief of the US Army to issue a proclamation providing for military measures to be taken upon the apprehension of Filipino citizens who voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy, cannot be seriously questioned.]

No. “The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at the same time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political department, and not the judicial department, to determine if war has ended. The fact that delivery of certain persons under custody of the US Army has already begun does not mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already terminated, which clearly it has not. Delivery within the power of military authorities to make even before was terminates.

2. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they have been and are being subjected?

No. Civil Courts should not interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our country’s faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.

Scheneckerburger vs. Moran, 63 Phil. 249 (1943)

FACTS: Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila was subsequently charged in CFI-Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to this
saying that under the US and Philippine Constitution, the CFI has no jurisdiction to try him. After his objection was overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the CFI from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. Aside from this, he contended that original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and consuls is conferred exclusively
upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the US Supreme Court has Original Jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al and such jurisdiction excludes courts of the Phils.

No. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic immunity. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on Nov. 15, 1935 caused the Philippine Constitution to go into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, consuls et.al.”

2. Whether or not original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al. is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines

“The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by themSupreme Court of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this constitution.” According to Sec. 17. of Act No. 136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus was also conferred on the CFI’s. As a result, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the time the Constitution was adopted was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFI’s. The original jurisdiction conferred to Supreme Court by the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction.

Judgment: CFI has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied.

U.S. v. Sweet, 1 Phil. 18 (1901)

FACTS: Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense against a POW. His case is filed with the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for
which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was “acting in the line of duty.”

ISSUES:
1. WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI.

Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greater
than $100 may be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed
to prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty.

2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the penal code?

Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW is not in the RPC, physical assault charges may be pressed under the RPC.

3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code, whether or not the military character sustained by the person charged with the offence at the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?

No. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character brought before them for trial (R.A.
No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act was servicebut this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the case.”

Judgment: Judgment thereby affirmed “An offense charged against a military officer in consequence of an act done in obedience to an order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government.” ––Per Cooper, J., concurring

Bouie vs. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)

FACTS: Two (2) Negro college students took seats in a booth in the restaurant department of Eckerds and waited to be served. As they were seated, the employee of the store put up a no
trespassing sign. The store manager called the police. When the police arrived, the manager asked them to leave but they did not. They were convicted by South Carolina SC on the grounds
of resisting arrest and criminal trespass.

Petitioners now contend that to construe the statute as such is violative of the due process clause since the state has punished them for conduct which was not criminal at the time they have
committed it.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were denied due process of law because the statute failed to afford fair warning that the conduct for which they have been convicted had been made a crime.

RULING: Decision of the South Carolina SC was reversed. The crime for which these petitioners stand convicted was "not enumerated in the statute" at the time of their conduct. It follows
that they have been deprived of liberty and property without due process of law.

To be convicted of criminal trespassing, the law statute states: “entry upon the lands of another after notice from the owner prohibiting such entry.” The petitioners should have first been
warned prior to entering the restaurant that to do so would constitute criminal trespassing. No prior warning was made. They were only asked to leave when they were inside. The
South Carolina SC construed the statute to cover also the act of remaining on the premises of another after receiving notice to leave.

A criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime. Since the statue was specific, there was no reason to broaden its scope, for this is like an ex post facto law. Ex post facto law has two instances:
1. It makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal and punishes such action.
2. It aggravates a crime and makes it greater than it was when committed.

When an unforeseeable state-court construction of a statute is applied retroactively and subjects a person to criminal liability, it deprives that person of due process in the sense of fair warning.

Applying those principles to this case, we agree with petitioners that 16-386 of the South Carolina Code did not give them fair warning, at the time of their conduct in Eckerd's Drug Store in 1960, that the act for which they now stand convicted was rendered criminal by the statute. By its terms, the statute prohibited only "entry upon the lands of another…after notice from the owner…prohibiting such entry…" There was nothing in the statute to indicate that it also prohibited the different act of remaining on the premises after being asked to leave.

Petitioners did not violate the statute as it was written; they received no notice before entering either the drugstore or the restaurant department. Indeed, they knew they would not receive any such notice before entering the store, for they were invited to purchase everything except food there. So far as the words of the statute were concerned, petitioners were given not
only no "fair warning," but no warning whatever, that their conduct in Eckerd's Drug Store would violate the statute.

Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)

FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates:
1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian,
2) permit to transfer/transport from the
provincial commander; and
3) three certificates of inspections.
In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the town’s police station commander while passing through Camarines Norte. The confiscation was
based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982

RULING: No. The said order is not enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2. 1982 because it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code and Sec-11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word “laws” in article 2 includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that “every order or
document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture
provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the
carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they
recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.

Judgment: Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents to restore carabaos, with the requisite documents, to petitioners for their
own disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.

Important point: Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice and fairness
dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000)

FACTS: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice, through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. Finally, the country is bound to the Vienna convention on the law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing

RULING: Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable
the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the Department of Justice as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request and the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for and ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice
and hearing according to Art. 3 sec 14(1) and (2), as well as Art. 3 sec 7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern and the corollary right to access to official records and documents.

The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective
extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process.

The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. The basic rights of notice and hearing are applicable in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings. Nonobservance
of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, may claim the right
to appear therein and present their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:
a.When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).
b.Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, and the respondent is not prevented from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time (summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee)
c.Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

2. Whether or not this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?

No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Section 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court.

3. WON there is any conflict between private respondent’s basic due process rights and the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition treaty

RULING: No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage.

Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Kapunan, separate concurring opinion:
While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake if our government’s international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction. Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the evaluation stage.

Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

FACTS: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates.

RULING: Yes. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern and corollarily access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances “of public nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.

Important Point: It illustrates how decrees and issuances issued by one man—Marcos—are in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive and legislative powers. The generality of law (Civil Code, Art. 14) will never work without constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice and is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

Table of Contents

Ang Mga Kaanib vs. Iglesia (December 12, 2001)

Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 PHIL 635 (1940)
Calderon vs. Carale (April 22, 1992)
Cayetano v. Monsod , 201 SCRA 210
CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396).
Ebralinag vs. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (1993)
Estrada v. Disierto, 253 SCRA 452 (2001)
Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006)
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)
IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL (IDCP) vs. Executive Secretary, et al (2003)
Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989)
SANLAKAS vs. EXEC SEC (02/03/2004)
Sarmiento vs. Mison 156 SCRA 549
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988 )

Ulep v. Legal Clinic 223 SCRA 378
Umil vs. Ramos

Ebralinag vs. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (1993)

FACTS: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God”. They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control.

ISSUE: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge

RULING: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses, this religious which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be condusive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all. While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 PHIL 635 (1940)

FACTS: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

ISSUE: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

RULING: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.

Calderon vs. Carale (April 22, 1992)

Petition for prohibition to review the constitutionality & legality of the appointment of respondents

FACTS: Sec.16, Art.VII: The President shall nominate &, w/ the consent of the Com on Appointments (CA), appoint the heads of the exec departments., ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain & other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, & those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments., agencies, commissions, or boards.

Sarmiento III v. Mison: (On power of CA to confirm appointments) The position of the BOC Commissioner (a bureau head) is not one of those w/n the 1st group of appointments where the consent of the CA is required. While the 1935 Constitution includes ‘heads of bureaus’ among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the CA, the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of ‘heads of bureaus’ from appointments that need the consent of CA. The intent was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by CA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII.

Bautista v. Salonga: The position of Chairman of the Com on Human Rights is not among those mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of 1987 Consti, appointments to w/c are to be made w/ the confirmation of the CA. The Pres appoints the CHR Chairman & members pursuant to the 2nd sentence in Sec. 16, Art VII, that is, w/o confirmation of CA bec they are among the officers of govt whom the Pres ‘may be authorized by law to appoint.’ And Sec 2(c) of EO 163 authorizes the Pres to appoint the Chairman & members of CHR.

Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Const’l Commissions: Since the seats reserved for sectoral reps in par.2, Sec. 5, Art VI may be filled by appointment by the Pres by express provision of Sec. 7, Art XVIII of the Consti, it is indubitable that sectoral reps are among the ‘other officers whose appointments are vested in the Pres in this Consti’ referred to in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII whose appointments are subject to CA confirmation.

DOCTRINES FROM THE 3 CASES:
1) Confirmation by CA is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII, including those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Consti in the Pres. 2) Confirmation is not required when the Pres appoints other govt officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. Also, in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconst’l manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not other wise provided by law.

In March 1989, RA 6715, amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved.Sec. 13, RA 6715: “The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by CA….”Pursuant to RA 6715, Pres Aquino appointed the Chairman & Commissioners of the NLRC. Drilon then issued AO No. 161, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.The present petition questions the constitutionality & legality of the permanent appointments mentioned above w/o submitting the same to CA for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715.PETITIONER: insists on a mandatory compliance w/ RA 6715. Mison & Bautista are not decisive in this case for in the case at bar, the Pres issued permanent appointments w/o submitting them to CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) w/c requires the confirmation by the CA of such appointments.SOLGEN (RESPONDENTS): RA 6715 transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII by expanding the confirmation powers of CA w/o const’l basis. Mison &Bautista laid the issue to rest.SOLGEN: “Three points as regards subsec. 3 of Sec. 10 of Art VII of the 1935 Consti & in the orig text of Sec. 16, Art. VII of 1987 Consti as proposed in Resolution No. 517:
1) in both, the appointments of heads of bureaus were required to be confirmed by CA;
2) in both, the appointments of other officers “whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law to appoint” are expressly made subject to confirmation by CA. However, in the final version of Resolution No. 517, as embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of 1987 Consti, the appointment of heads of bureaus & other officers whose appointments are not provided for by law & those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint – are excluded from the list of those officers whose appointments are to be confirmed by CA; 3) Under 1935 Consti, the word “nominate” qualifies the entire Subsec.3 of Sec. 10 of Art VII thereof.SOLGEN: If confirmation is required, the 3 stage process of nomination, confirmation & appointment operates. This is only true of the 1st grp enumerated in Sec. 16, Art. VII but the word nominate does not appear in the 2nd & 3rd sentences. Therefore, the president’s appointment pursuant to the 2nd & 3rd sentences need no confirmation.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by CA of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose appointments require confirmation by the CA.

RULING: Mison: There are 4 groups of officers whom the Pres shall appoint
1) Heads of exec depts., ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose appointment are vested in him in this Consti.
2) All other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
3) Those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint
4) Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the Pres alone.

In the course of the debates on the text of Sec 16, Art VII, there were 2 major changes proposed & approved by Const’l Commission: 1) exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by CA; 2) exclusion of appointments made under the 2nd sentence of the section from the same requirement.

The 2nd sentence refers to all other officers of the govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law & those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint.

The NLRC Chairman & Commissioners fall w/n the 2nd sentence of Sec 16, Art VII, more specifically, under the “third grp” in Mison (I.e. those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint). Thus, they are not among those mentioned in 1st sentence whose appointments require confirmation by CA.

To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by CA of the appointments of respondents Chairman & Members of NLRC, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because:
1) It amends by legislation, the 1st sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by CA
2) It amends by legislation the 2nd sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by imposing the confirmation of the CA on appointments w/c are otherwise entrusted only w/ the Pres. Legislation cannot expand a constitutional provision after the SC has interpreted it.

Sec 16, Art VII was deliberately intended by the framers to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the CA exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidentiall appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation.

Subsec. 3, Sec. 10, Art. VII, 1935 Constitution: “The Pres shall nominate & w/ the consent of the CA, shall appoint the heads of the exec departments. & bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy & Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, & all other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, & those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.

The solution to Congress’ displeasure/disapproval to the deliberate limitation on the CA’s power of confirmation is a future constitutional change w/c may consider either a return to the 1935 constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between 1935 & 1987 Constitution.

RULING: Petition DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of CA of appointments of the Chairman & Members of the NLRC is UNCONSTITUTIONAL & of no legal force & effect.

CLU vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

FACTS: The petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant secre­taries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions.

RULING: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOOCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless other­wise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment.

xxx The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family under Sec. 13, Art. VII as compared to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7, par. 2 are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution. to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution. itself. xxx

However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII, Sec. 13 must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein w/o addition compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said official's office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" w/in the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials.
(b) They shall not practice any other profession.
(c) They shall not participate in any business.
(d) They shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted.

In Aquino vs Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546, the SC upheld the power of the President to create military tribunals authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil courts were open and functioning, thus rejecting the "open court" theory. The SC there held: "Martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction, must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. xxx

In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, the Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2 decision was reversed. According to the SC, civilians who are placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process. Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military govt. and even on the premise that mar­tial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly function­ing. The assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander in Chief or on any theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To hold otherwise is a violation of the right to due process.

"The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminished salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is a pervasive one in military laws, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.

IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)

FACTS: Following an alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, Pres. Estrada ordered the deployment of the Phil. Marines to join in visibility patrols around the metropolis. The Pres. invoked his Comm.-in-Chief powers under Sec 18, Art VII of the Constitution. The IBP seeks to nullify the order on constitutional grounds.

ISSUE: Does it have standing?

HELD: Locus standi has been defined as personal & substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as result of the challenged act. In this case, IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the constitution. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law & nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothed it w/ standing. That is too general, an interests that is shared by other groups & the whole citizenry. IBP’s fundamental purpose that is to elevate the standards of the law profession & improve the administration of justice, cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.

Sanlakas vs. Exec Sec (2004)

Tinga, J.
FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion. -by evening, soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.

Petitioners:
1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that there exists no factual basis for the declaration, mutiny having ceased.
2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs & bar reviewers"; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of the state of rebellion, declaration a "constitutional anomaly" that misleads because "overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens"; proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same S18, Art7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law; presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration of a state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of emergency powers, such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution
4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution; petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion

Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot by the lifitng of the proclamation; questions standing of petitioners

ISSUES:
1. whether or not petitioners have standing
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the lifting of the proclamation 3. whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper

RULING: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the House and Sen Pimentel have standing. Sanlakas & PM have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez "… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory relief, which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even assuming that Sanlakas & PM are "people's organizations" in the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of the Consti, they are still not endowed with standing for as in Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers, is not endowed with standing since "A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court has ruled out the doctrine of "transcendental importance" regarding constitutional questions in this particular case. Only members of Congress, who's (?) powers as provided in the Consti on giving the Pres emergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can question the legality of the proclamation of the state of rebellion.

2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case, since prior events (the May 1, 2001 incident when the Pres also declared a state of rebellion) prove that it can be repeated. 3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7 does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The ponencia then traced the evolution of executive power in the US (Jackson and the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and teh 'war powers', Cleveland in In re: Eugene Debs) in an effort to show that "the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State." This, plus Marcos v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of the Pres to declare a certain status, argue towards the validity of the proclamation. However, the Court maintains that the declaration is devoid of any legal significance for being superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.