Rule on Small Claims
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
R.A. No. 9048
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
Rule 70: Unlawful Detainer vs. Forcible Entry
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
Sunday, July 11, 2010
People vs. Bandian, 63 Phil 530 (1936)
FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few
moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion.
Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide
Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol—she considers him her husband as he considers him his wife—began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it was his and that they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable
to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance, to take hernchild from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she
was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she had been accused of.
moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion.
Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide
Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol—she considers him her husband as he considers him his wife—began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it was his and that they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable
to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance, to take hernchild from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she
was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she had been accused of.
People vs. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)
FACTS: 1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On June 5, 1990, Tujan was arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion to quash invoking protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile v. Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in subversion. It was granted by the trial court and the court of appeals.
ISSUE: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous charge under RA 1700.
Ratio: No.
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this case, first case was not even arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession of firearms.
However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to the accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didn’t raise this issue. PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance of subversion
Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended. Release Tujan.
ISSUE: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous charge under RA 1700.
Ratio: No.
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this case, first case was not even arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession of firearms.
However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to the accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didn’t raise this issue. PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance of subversion
Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended. Release Tujan.
Bernardo vs. People, 123 SCRA 365 (1983)
FACTS: Bemardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa’s Riceland in Bulacan from Oct. ’72 to Aug. ‘74. His son stayed with him in the house built on that land. The tenancy rights of the house were
left with the son when the father transferred but without Sta. Rosa knowing. Eventually, Sta. Rosa took possession of the whole rice field and filed a case of forcible entry against the Bernardos. The Bernardos lost in their cases before the Municipal Court Sta. Rosa sent a letter of demand to petitioners telling them to vacate their house and land but since they refused, a criminal complaint was charged against them for violation of PD 772 on squatting.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction to entertain criminal case for alleged violation of presidential decree no 772 since the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute an offence or violation of said law
RULING: Petition for certiorari is granted. No person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is
not clearly made so by the statute. Based on its preamble, PD 772 applied only to squatters in urban areas and not to agricultural lands.
left with the son when the father transferred but without Sta. Rosa knowing. Eventually, Sta. Rosa took possession of the whole rice field and filed a case of forcible entry against the Bernardos. The Bernardos lost in their cases before the Municipal Court Sta. Rosa sent a letter of demand to petitioners telling them to vacate their house and land but since they refused, a criminal complaint was charged against them for violation of PD 772 on squatting.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction to entertain criminal case for alleged violation of presidential decree no 772 since the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute an offence or violation of said law
RULING: Petition for certiorari is granted. No person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is
not clearly made so by the statute. Based on its preamble, PD 772 applied only to squatters in urban areas and not to agricultural lands.
PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for Reconsideration given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners’ contention that while Sec.8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application.
2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.
The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial
of the State’s right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for Reconsideration given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners’ contention that while Sec.8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application.
2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.
The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial
of the State’s right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
PEOPLE, et al. v. Lacson, April 1, 2003
FACTS: Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims?
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified,
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been done
a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims.
2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. “Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice.
Held: Motion granted
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims?
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified,
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been done
a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims.
2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. “Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice.
Held: Motion granted
People vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002
FACTS: Soon after the announcement on May 18, 1995 that the Kuratong Baleleng gang had been slain in a shootout with the police, two witnesses surfaced providing the testimony that the said slaying was a rub-out. On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director or Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The nextof- kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel.
On November 2, 1995, after two resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11 informations of murder against the defendant and 25 policemen as principals. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman and in a re-investigation, the informations were amended downgrading the principal into an accessory. With the downgrading of charges, the case was later transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC not due to jurisdictional questions over the suspects but due to the failure to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. Before the arraignment, the witnesses of the
prosecution recanted their statements while the seven (7) private complainants submitted their affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed individual motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. The cases were dismissed.
It was on March 27, 2001 when PNP director Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice new affidavits of new witnesses which it began to investigate and to file with the RTC. The
respondent, invoking among others, their right against double jeopardy, then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition stating that Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
bans the revival of the murder cases against him; a petition the Court of Appeals denied. On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The defendant filed for determination of probable cause and an outright dismissal in the RTC. The CA considered the original cases to be provisionally dismissed and the new cases as mere revivals. Under Section 8 rule 117 of RRCP of 2000, the cases were dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang.
RULING: Remanded to the RTC to determine if they complied with rule and case should be dismissed. There is no question that the new rule can be given retroactive effect given article 22 of the RPC. There can be no ruling, however, due to the lack of sufficient factual bases to support such a ruling. There is need of proof to show the following facts:
(1) provisional dismissal of the case had the express consent of the accused
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after giving notice to the offended party
(3) whether the two (2) year period to revive the case has already elapsed
(4) whether there is justification for filing of the cases beyond the 2 year period.
The respondent expressed consent, however, the records do not reveal whether the notices to the offended parties were given before the cases were provisionally dismissed. Only the right to double Jeopardy by the defendant was tackled by the litigants. The records are also inconclusive with regards to the 2-year bar, if within or without. Because of this, both prosecution and defendant must be given ample time to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the adduced evidence.
On November 2, 1995, after two resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11 informations of murder against the defendant and 25 policemen as principals. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman and in a re-investigation, the informations were amended downgrading the principal into an accessory. With the downgrading of charges, the case was later transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC not due to jurisdictional questions over the suspects but due to the failure to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. Before the arraignment, the witnesses of the
prosecution recanted their statements while the seven (7) private complainants submitted their affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed individual motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. The cases were dismissed.
It was on March 27, 2001 when PNP director Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice new affidavits of new witnesses which it began to investigate and to file with the RTC. The
respondent, invoking among others, their right against double jeopardy, then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition stating that Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
bans the revival of the murder cases against him; a petition the Court of Appeals denied. On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The defendant filed for determination of probable cause and an outright dismissal in the RTC. The CA considered the original cases to be provisionally dismissed and the new cases as mere revivals. Under Section 8 rule 117 of RRCP of 2000, the cases were dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang.
RULING: Remanded to the RTC to determine if they complied with rule and case should be dismissed. There is no question that the new rule can be given retroactive effect given article 22 of the RPC. There can be no ruling, however, due to the lack of sufficient factual bases to support such a ruling. There is need of proof to show the following facts:
(1) provisional dismissal of the case had the express consent of the accused
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after giving notice to the offended party
(3) whether the two (2) year period to revive the case has already elapsed
(4) whether there is justification for filing of the cases beyond the 2 year period.
The respondent expressed consent, however, the records do not reveal whether the notices to the offended parties were given before the cases were provisionally dismissed. Only the right to double Jeopardy by the defendant was tackled by the litigants. The records are also inconclusive with regards to the 2-year bar, if within or without. Because of this, both prosecution and defendant must be given ample time to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the adduced evidence.
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