Table of Contents

Ang Mga Kaanib vs. Iglesia (December 12, 2001)

Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 PHIL 635 (1940)
Calderon vs. Carale (April 22, 1992)
Cayetano v. Monsod , 201 SCRA 210
CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396).
Ebralinag vs. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (1993)
Estrada v. Disierto, 253 SCRA 452 (2001)
Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006)
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)
IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL (IDCP) vs. Executive Secretary, et al (2003)
Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989)
SANLAKAS vs. EXEC SEC (02/03/2004)
Sarmiento vs. Mison 156 SCRA 549
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988 )

Ulep v. Legal Clinic 223 SCRA 378
Umil vs. Ramos

Ebralinag vs. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (1993)

FACTS: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God”. They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control.

ISSUE: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge

RULING: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses, this religious which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be condusive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all. While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 PHIL 635 (1940)

FACTS: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

ISSUE: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

RULING: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.

Calderon vs. Carale (April 22, 1992)

Petition for prohibition to review the constitutionality & legality of the appointment of respondents

FACTS: Sec.16, Art.VII: The President shall nominate &, w/ the consent of the Com on Appointments (CA), appoint the heads of the exec departments., ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain & other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, & those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments., agencies, commissions, or boards.

Sarmiento III v. Mison: (On power of CA to confirm appointments) The position of the BOC Commissioner (a bureau head) is not one of those w/n the 1st group of appointments where the consent of the CA is required. While the 1935 Constitution includes ‘heads of bureaus’ among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the CA, the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of ‘heads of bureaus’ from appointments that need the consent of CA. The intent was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by CA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII.

Bautista v. Salonga: The position of Chairman of the Com on Human Rights is not among those mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of 1987 Consti, appointments to w/c are to be made w/ the confirmation of the CA. The Pres appoints the CHR Chairman & members pursuant to the 2nd sentence in Sec. 16, Art VII, that is, w/o confirmation of CA bec they are among the officers of govt whom the Pres ‘may be authorized by law to appoint.’ And Sec 2(c) of EO 163 authorizes the Pres to appoint the Chairman & members of CHR.

Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Const’l Commissions: Since the seats reserved for sectoral reps in par.2, Sec. 5, Art VI may be filled by appointment by the Pres by express provision of Sec. 7, Art XVIII of the Consti, it is indubitable that sectoral reps are among the ‘other officers whose appointments are vested in the Pres in this Consti’ referred to in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII whose appointments are subject to CA confirmation.

DOCTRINES FROM THE 3 CASES:
1) Confirmation by CA is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII, including those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Consti in the Pres. 2) Confirmation is not required when the Pres appoints other govt officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. Also, in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconst’l manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not other wise provided by law.

In March 1989, RA 6715, amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved.Sec. 13, RA 6715: “The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by CA….”Pursuant to RA 6715, Pres Aquino appointed the Chairman & Commissioners of the NLRC. Drilon then issued AO No. 161, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.The present petition questions the constitutionality & legality of the permanent appointments mentioned above w/o submitting the same to CA for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715.PETITIONER: insists on a mandatory compliance w/ RA 6715. Mison & Bautista are not decisive in this case for in the case at bar, the Pres issued permanent appointments w/o submitting them to CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) w/c requires the confirmation by the CA of such appointments.SOLGEN (RESPONDENTS): RA 6715 transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII by expanding the confirmation powers of CA w/o const’l basis. Mison &Bautista laid the issue to rest.SOLGEN: “Three points as regards subsec. 3 of Sec. 10 of Art VII of the 1935 Consti & in the orig text of Sec. 16, Art. VII of 1987 Consti as proposed in Resolution No. 517:
1) in both, the appointments of heads of bureaus were required to be confirmed by CA;
2) in both, the appointments of other officers “whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law to appoint” are expressly made subject to confirmation by CA. However, in the final version of Resolution No. 517, as embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of 1987 Consti, the appointment of heads of bureaus & other officers whose appointments are not provided for by law & those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint – are excluded from the list of those officers whose appointments are to be confirmed by CA; 3) Under 1935 Consti, the word “nominate” qualifies the entire Subsec.3 of Sec. 10 of Art VII thereof.SOLGEN: If confirmation is required, the 3 stage process of nomination, confirmation & appointment operates. This is only true of the 1st grp enumerated in Sec. 16, Art. VII but the word nominate does not appear in the 2nd & 3rd sentences. Therefore, the president’s appointment pursuant to the 2nd & 3rd sentences need no confirmation.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by CA of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose appointments require confirmation by the CA.

RULING: Mison: There are 4 groups of officers whom the Pres shall appoint
1) Heads of exec depts., ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose appointment are vested in him in this Consti.
2) All other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
3) Those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint
4) Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the Pres alone.

In the course of the debates on the text of Sec 16, Art VII, there were 2 major changes proposed & approved by Const’l Commission: 1) exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by CA; 2) exclusion of appointments made under the 2nd sentence of the section from the same requirement.

The 2nd sentence refers to all other officers of the govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law & those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint.

The NLRC Chairman & Commissioners fall w/n the 2nd sentence of Sec 16, Art VII, more specifically, under the “third grp” in Mison (I.e. those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint). Thus, they are not among those mentioned in 1st sentence whose appointments require confirmation by CA.

To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by CA of the appointments of respondents Chairman & Members of NLRC, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because:
1) It amends by legislation, the 1st sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by CA
2) It amends by legislation the 2nd sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by imposing the confirmation of the CA on appointments w/c are otherwise entrusted only w/ the Pres. Legislation cannot expand a constitutional provision after the SC has interpreted it.

Sec 16, Art VII was deliberately intended by the framers to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the CA exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidentiall appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation.

Subsec. 3, Sec. 10, Art. VII, 1935 Constitution: “The Pres shall nominate & w/ the consent of the CA, shall appoint the heads of the exec departments. & bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy & Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, & all other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, & those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.

The solution to Congress’ displeasure/disapproval to the deliberate limitation on the CA’s power of confirmation is a future constitutional change w/c may consider either a return to the 1935 constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between 1935 & 1987 Constitution.

RULING: Petition DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of CA of appointments of the Chairman & Members of the NLRC is UNCONSTITUTIONAL & of no legal force & effect.

CLU vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

FACTS: The petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant secre­taries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions.

RULING: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOOCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless other­wise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment.

xxx The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family under Sec. 13, Art. VII as compared to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7, par. 2 are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution. to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution. itself. xxx

However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII, Sec. 13 must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein w/o addition compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said official's office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" w/in the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials.
(b) They shall not practice any other profession.
(c) They shall not participate in any business.
(d) They shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted.

In Aquino vs Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546, the SC upheld the power of the President to create military tribunals authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil courts were open and functioning, thus rejecting the "open court" theory. The SC there held: "Martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction, must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. xxx

In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, the Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2 decision was reversed. According to the SC, civilians who are placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process. Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military govt. and even on the premise that mar­tial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly function­ing. The assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander in Chief or on any theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To hold otherwise is a violation of the right to due process.

"The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminished salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is a pervasive one in military laws, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.

IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)

FACTS: Following an alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, Pres. Estrada ordered the deployment of the Phil. Marines to join in visibility patrols around the metropolis. The Pres. invoked his Comm.-in-Chief powers under Sec 18, Art VII of the Constitution. The IBP seeks to nullify the order on constitutional grounds.

ISSUE: Does it have standing?

HELD: Locus standi has been defined as personal & substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as result of the challenged act. In this case, IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the constitution. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law & nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothed it w/ standing. That is too general, an interests that is shared by other groups & the whole citizenry. IBP’s fundamental purpose that is to elevate the standards of the law profession & improve the administration of justice, cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.

Sanlakas vs. Exec Sec (2004)

Tinga, J.
FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion. -by evening, soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.

Petitioners:
1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that there exists no factual basis for the declaration, mutiny having ceased.
2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs & bar reviewers"; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of the state of rebellion, declaration a "constitutional anomaly" that misleads because "overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens"; proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same S18, Art7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law; presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration of a state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of emergency powers, such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution
4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution; petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion

Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot by the lifitng of the proclamation; questions standing of petitioners

ISSUES:
1. whether or not petitioners have standing
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the lifting of the proclamation 3. whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper

RULING: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the House and Sen Pimentel have standing. Sanlakas & PM have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez "… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory relief, which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even assuming that Sanlakas & PM are "people's organizations" in the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of the Consti, they are still not endowed with standing for as in Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers, is not endowed with standing since "A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court has ruled out the doctrine of "transcendental importance" regarding constitutional questions in this particular case. Only members of Congress, who's (?) powers as provided in the Consti on giving the Pres emergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can question the legality of the proclamation of the state of rebellion.

2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case, since prior events (the May 1, 2001 incident when the Pres also declared a state of rebellion) prove that it can be repeated. 3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7 does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The ponencia then traced the evolution of executive power in the US (Jackson and the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and teh 'war powers', Cleveland in In re: Eugene Debs) in an effort to show that "the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State." This, plus Marcos v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of the Pres to declare a certain status, argue towards the validity of the proclamation. However, the Court maintains that the declaration is devoid of any legal significance for being superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.