Manuel v. Villena, 37 SCRA 745 (1971)

FACTS: This is an appeal from the order of the CFI of Tarlac dismissing the case entitled “Manuel v. Villena, the Director of Forest and the Secretary of ANR,” wherein the plaintiff sought the annulment of the decision of the said public official rejecting his application for a Tree Farm Permit over a 20-hectare parcel of land, which was included in a 66-hectare are covered by a similar application of private defendant Villena.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the Secretary of DENR should be set aside

RULING: Under Section 1838 of the RAC, this function falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of Forestry with the approval of the Secretary of ANR.

The power thus conferred on the Director of Forestry with the approval of the Secretary of ANR is basically executive or administrative in nature. And courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with the proceedings undertaken by the administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally better equipped technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as government policy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisions.

There are of course, limits to the exercise of administrative discretion. Administrative proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon the showing that “the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion” or that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.

Since 1838 of the RAC does not require the investigation be in the nature of a court trial. In deciding administrative questions, administrative bodies or officials generally enjoy wide discretion. Technical rule of procedure are not strictly enforced and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable. It is sufficient that substantive due process requirement of fairness and reasonableness be observed.

Absence of previous notice is not itself a substantial defect; what the law abhors is the lack of opportunity to be heard.

It was not essential that the appellant be represented by a lawyer. The investigation conducted by Bureau of Forestry was purely fact-finding. It was not required to be in a form of a trial where both parties, each represented by a counsel, confront each other and their witnesses. In any case, appellant does not allege that the presence of a lawyer could have altered the result of the investigation. He does not even cite any substantial error in the findings of the Director of Forestry which could have been avoided, if a lawyer had represented him.

It should be noted that the order of the Acting Secretary of ANR, a formal investigation of the case was ordered. That the investigation was actually conducted was not denied, and is borne out by the decision of the Secretary dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal.

We have examined the documents and pleadings reproduced in the appellant’s record on appeal, particularly the decision of the Secretary of ANR which is sought to be set aside, and we find that the said decision is based on a thorough analysis of the facts as revealed by evidence.

Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 11 SCRA 317 (1964)

FACTS: In an alleged letter-petition, petitioner was charged with black market of electric meters and that its meters were installed in bad faith to register excessive rates. Petitioner received a communication from General Auditing Office (GAO) that it will be audited. PSC issued subsequently a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioners to produce before PSC, during a conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain book of accounts. Petitioner moved to quash such subpoena. The conference was postponed twice until it was finally cancelled. In May 1962, PSC issued an order, which after finding that petitioner had an excess of revenues by 18%, lowered the present meter rates of petitioner. Hence, this petition for certiorari is instituted.

ISSUE: WON notice and hearing is required                 

RULING: Yes.

In support to its special defense, respondent PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice or hearing. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates – when such are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines – may partake of legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Here, the order exclusively applies to petitioner. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact, whether the petitioner is making a profit more than 12% of its invested capital which is denied by the petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of the said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

Indeed, Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of CA No. 146, explicitly require notice and hearing.

Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of partakes the nature of quasi-judicial function and that, having been issued without previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and hence, null and void. 

National Development Co. v. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429 (1963)

FACTS: The NDC which is engaged in the shipping business under the name of “Philippine National Lines” is the owner of the steamship “S.S. Doña Nati” whose local agent in Manila is A.V. Rocha.

When the customs authorities found that the vessel Doña Nati carried on board unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21 in violation of Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code, respondent sent a written notice to C.F. Sharp and Company, believing it to be the operator or agent of the vessel, and when the latter referred the notice to A.V. Rocha, the real operator of the vessel, for such step as he may deem necessary to be taken, the latter answered stating that the television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be manifested, and he added to his answer the following: “If this explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case be set for investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in its defense.

Respondent, however, replied to this letter saying that said television was a cargo within the meaning of the law and so he does not find his explanation satisfactory and then and there imposed on the vessel a fine of P5,000.00. Respondent even went further. He ordered that the said fine be paid within 48 hours from receipt with the threat that the vessel would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure would be issued if the fine would not be paid. Considering that this is a grave abuse of discretion, petitioners commenced the present action for certiorari before the court a quo.

ISSUE: WON notice and hearing is required

RULING: We find this action proper for it really appears that the petitioner Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Under said section, in order that an imported article or merchandize may be considered a cargo that should be manifested, it is first necessary that it be so established for the reason that there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the requirement of law, among which are the personal effects of the members of the crew.

The fact that the set in question was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. This is precisely what petitioner Rocha has requested in his letter. Not only he was denied this chance, but respondent collector immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00. This is a denial of the elementary rule of due process.

True it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar as the determination of any customs law or regulation is concerned, or of any act arising under the Tariff and Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely administrative, where the rules of procedure are generally disregarded, but even in the administrative proceedings, due process must be observed because that is the right enshrined in our Constitution. The right to due process is not merely statutory. It is a constitutional right. Indeed, the Constitution provides that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law,” which clause epitomizes the principle of justice which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. That this principle applies with equal force to administrative proceedings was well elaborated upon by this Court in the Ang Tibay case.  

Another point raised is that the petitioners have brought this action prematurely for they have not exhausted all the administrative remedies available to them, one of which is to appeal the ruling to the Commissioner of Customs. This may be true, but such step we do not consider a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law as would prevent the petitioners from taking the present action, for it is undisputed that respondent collector has acted in utter disregard of the principle of due process. 

Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 538

FACTS: Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry.

PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August 9, 1973. When ISA’s original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31, 1979.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The construction of such steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.

Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land.

Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.

ISSUE: WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.

RULING: Yes

.

Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic.

We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as “legal personality.”

When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties and functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.

When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272.

The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings. 

Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS:  On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official.  The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. 

Betrayal of Public Trust

The question is whether or not the offenses allegedly committed by CJ Corona are impeachable offenses.

In particular, is the error in accomplishing the SALN (Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth) a sufficient ground to impeach a chief justice? Is CJ Corona guilty of betrayal of public trust?

Anyway, to have a clearer background on what constitute betrayal of public trust, read the article of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.

For law students, take note of the meaning of ejusdem generis, a principle in statutory construction.

Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay 540 SCRA 424

FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?

RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.

Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

• the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
• the payment of professional tax;
• the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
• the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

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